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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether a public sector premium exists even after controlling 
for observable characteristics and for additional motivations, other than monetary, that may 
induce workers to prefer employment in the public sector. We do this by studying the entire 
conditional wage distribution on Italian micro data, covering the period 1998-2008. The 
evidence under random sampling shows the existence of a wage differential averaging at 
about 14% for women and 4% for men, generally lower at the high tail of the wage 
distribution and in the Northern regions. The premium significantly increases when possible 
sorting is considered; the correction is particularly large above the median of the wage 
distribution, therefore suggesting that the additional motivations may play an important role 
above all at higher wage levels. When we restrict our comparison to large private firms, a 
differential is confirmed for women but not for men. 
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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations. 1 Introduction 1
Wage and employment characteristics in the public sector dier signicantly from those in the pri-
vate sector. Analyses comparing average earnings outcomes in public and private sectors generally
nd positive wage dierentials for public sector employees. These analyses either use aggregate
data on average wages, which are easily obtained from published sources, or use individual data
in an attempt to control for the quality and the composition of public employees relative to pri-
vate employees. When controlling for employment characteristics, the wage dierential typically
decreases with the number of controls and varies with the econometric specication and across
countries.
Several types of econometric techniques have been adopted to investigate the wage gap between
sectors using individual data. One approach estimates a single earning equation augmented with
a dummy variable indicating whether the worker is employed in the public sector or not. The
coecient of such a variable provides a measure of the wage dierential after having controlled
for other characteristics of the worker. In the same vein, another econometric specication allows
the coecients to vary across sectors. It consists of two wage equations, one for each sector, in
order to capture dierent returns to worker characteristics. The wage gap is obtained by taking the
dierence between the worker's actual wage and the estimate of what the worker would earn in the
sector in which he is not employed. Through standard decomposition techniques it is then possible
to disentangle the impact on the wage gap of dierences in worker endowments from that associated
with unexplained factors (usually interpreted as the `rent to public sector'). More recently, quantile
regression techniques have also been used to compare wages in the public and the private sectors
along the entire wage distribution. These analyses usually nd higher dierentials at the bottom
end of the distribution and lower or even negative premia at the top deciles.
The results obtained by all the above techniques should be interpreted with caution. Indeed,
there may be a sample selection bias due to the possibility that sorting of employees between sectors
is not random but occurs on the basis of unobserved characteristics. This problem has typically been
addressed by jointly estimating equations for the worker's sector of employment and for earnings
(relying on a set of exclusion restrictions), or by using longitudinal data. To choose appropriate
instruments the literature has tended to follow some studies into whether certain characteristics of
individual employees increase the probability that they will seek employment in the public sector.
For example, Bellante - Link (1981) nd that workers employed in the public sector are more
risk averse than private sector employees. Perry - Wise (1990) argue that public sector jobs are
likely to provide a greater scope than in the private sector to engage in community or welfare-type
activities that will aect individual workers' labour supply decisions; nally, imitation of parents
and the presence of social networks, as summarized by variables related to family background, can
1We would like to thank Raaello Bronzini, Blaise Melly, Franco Peracchi, Marzia Romanelli, Paolo Sestito,
Roberto Torrini and seminar participants at the 2010 Annual meeting of the International Institute of Public Fi-
nance (Uppsal, Sweden), ESPE 2010 (Essen, Germany), the 9th Journ ees d'Economie Publique Louis-Andr e G erard
Varet, (Marseille, France), SIEP 2010 (Pavia, Italy), the Fourth Italian Congress of Econometrics and Empirical
Economics (Pisa, Italy) for useful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank an anonymous ref-
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own and do not necessarily re
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5be important channels to enter one sector or the other. A somewhat related argument is proposed
by Heyes (2005) and Barigozzi - Turati (2011), who explore the role of intrinsic motivation in the
market for nurses. They claim that workers, if intrinsically motivated to perform their job, receive
a non-pecuniary benet (a vocational premium) in addition to the wage rate. This implies that a
wage increase, by attracting workers with low intrinsic motivation under certain conditions, may
have adverse eects on the average vocation and hence on the average quality of services. Estimated
wage gaps obtained by means of sample selection corrections are generally found to be greater than
those not conditioned on these corrections.
Despite the large body of empirical literature on the public sector pay gap, the theory of
why such a wage dierential exists is scant.2 Most arguments invoked to justify the evidence
of a wage dierential are related to the peculiarity of the public employer's objective function,
which encompasses lobbying (Gunderson, 1978), electoral motives (Fogel - Lewin, 1974) or budget-
maximization (Niskanen, 1975; Reder, 1975). Other arguments focus on the relatively inelastic
labour demand curve in the public sector that the unions would exploit, to the extent allowed by
the government budget constraint, to gain higher wages for public sector workers. In a country
where tax evasion is deemed to be signicant and largely conned to the private sector (up to 27%
in Italy according to Schneider, 2002) a further reason for the pay gap can be that, for a given
gross salary, tax evasion leads to dierent net salaries across sectors; thus, the only way to make
the public sector attractive for workers is to oer the same net salary rate (Levaggi, 2007).3
In this paper we contribute to the empirical analysis. We investigate the public-private pay
gap using Italian micro data covering the period 1998-2008. In contrast to most of the existing
literature, we analyse the entire distribution of (log) wage, by using conditional quantile regression
techniques, and properly consider the possible endogeneity of the sector choice. To our knowledge,
the only other attempt to jointly address these issues is provided by Melly (2006). As exclusion
restrictions, in addition to variables related to parents' occupational status as in the existing litera-
ture, we investigate the roles of risk aversion, inter-temporal preferences and pro-social attitude. We
check the robustness of our ndings distinguishing between small and large rms or using dierent
measures of job compensation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the existing empirical evidence, focussing
in particular on Italy; Section 3 brie
y describes our empirical strategy; Section 4 presents the data
and some descriptive statistics; Section 5 discusses our ndings; Section 6 oers some concluding
remarks.
2 Related literature
Most of the early research on this issue focussed on the US; only few studies based on macro
data were carried on non-US countries. At the beginning of the '90s a number of studies started
2The only theoretical paper on the sectoral wage dierential is Holmlund (1993). In his paper the public and
private sector unions bargain over wages with a utilitarian government. The model predicts a wage premium only if
the unions act uncooperatively. In this case, in fact, the unions do not internalize two sources of externalities: the
rst involves the increase in taxes needed to pay for the increase in public sector wages, which are spread across all
workers; the second is due to the fact that increases in public sector wages will cause employment in the public sector
to decrease, and therefore consumption of goods produced by the public sector to decrease, but again for all workers
and not just for public sector workers.
3 Notice however that papers that explicitly tackle the issue of tax evasion in Italy use the same dataset that we
use here as the benchmark for the true income (see Cannari - Ceriani - D'Alessio, 1995, and Fiorio - D'Amuri, 2005).
6addressing wage dierentials in Europe, Australia and some developing countries. Bender (1998)
and Gregory - Borland (1999) provide extensive surveys of such analyses in a range of countries.
Among more recent studies focussing on European countries, Portugal - Centeno (2001) use the
1995 wave of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to compare wage dierentials
between the general government and the private sector in the European Union member states.
Considering identical worker's characteristics, they nd that the wage gap is wider in Portugal,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain and Italy; it is narrower in Austria, Belgium, Germany; in Denmark
the dierential turns out slightly negative.
Cross-country analyses can be useful to assess the impact on wage dierentials of dierent insti-
tutions, wage setting schemes, macro-economic and labour market conditions or culture. However,
heterogeneity in data collection and, in particular, in the denition of the public sector may yield
spurious results.
Within EU studies, a single country perspective is adopted by Disney - Gosling (1998, 2003) who
focus on British data in the nineties. Using a panel data xed eects approach robust to possible
sector sorting, they nd that women in the public sector earn more than in the private sector,
whilst on average men do not. Melly (2005, 2006) analyses the public sector pay gap in Germany.
In his 2005 paper he measures and decomposes the dierences in wage distributions between public
sector and private sector employees for the years 1984-2001, and obtains higher conditional wages
in the public sector only for the women. Furthermore, wage premia are found only at the low
end of the wage distribution, whereas dierences in workers' characteristics explain more than the
raw wage gap at high wages. These features appear quite stable over both decades. Using data on
Germany in 2003, Melly (2006) addresses the issue of possible sorting between the two sectors, along
the entire conditional distribution. He nds a positive premium at the low end of the conditional
wage distribution and a signicant negative premium at the upper tail under the assumption of
exogenous sector choice. When endogenous sorting is considered, the premium increases by roughly
40 percentage points. Postel-Vinay - Turon (2007) estimate a model of income and employment
dynamics for the UK in the period 1996{2003. They allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the
propensity to be unemployed or employed in either job sector, exploiting the panel structure of
their data. They nd a positive average public premium both in income 
ows and in the present
discounted sum of future income 
ows. Bargain - Melly (2008) estimate the public sector wage
premium in France over the period 1990-2002, both at the mean and at dierent quantiles of the
wage distribution. They account for unobserved heterogeneity by using xed eects estimations on
panel data. Contrary to common results, they nd that wages do not substantially dier across
sectors after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. They explain these results by arguing that
the public sector manages to attract better workers in the lower part of the distribution, in part
due to non-monetary gains, but fails to retain the most productive ones at the top.
2.1 The wage gap in Italy
In Italy the dierence in pay between the public and the private sectors in recent decades has always
been sizeable. If we look at aggregate data from national accounts the gap was about 20 percent
in 1980 and reached almost 40 percent in 1990, following a series of particularly favourable wage
renewal contracts in the public sector; it decreased to 22 percent in 1995, re
ecting the overall scal
consolidation eort required under the Maastricht Treaty to join the European Monetary Union;
the dierential started increasing again at the beginning of the last decade, to reach 33 percent in
72010 (Figure 1).
This evolution seems to contrast with the introduction in 1993 of the current legislation, which
aimed at a \privatization" of employment relations in the public sector, that is at making pay and
employment condition determination mechanisms in the public sector closer to those in the private
sector, by envisaging a greater role for negotiation, imposing tighter constraints on wage growth,
and replacing the automatic component for wage increases with schemes based on merit. The 1993
reform assigned a larger role to collective bargaining and created an independent agency (Agen-
zia per la Rappresentanza Negoziale nella Pubblica Amministrazione - ARAN) to be responsible
for negotiating pay levels and working conditions for most public employees. In principle, closer
cooperation between unions in the public and the private sectors during the wage determination
process (which could have followed the greater role assigned to collective bargaining in the public
sector) together with a more centralized bargaining process (due to the creation of a single agency
representing a vast majority of public employees) should have fostered wage moderation in the
public sector or, at least, determined wage dynamics in the public sector more in line with those in
the private sector. (Forni - Giordano, 2003, present a theoretical model that delivers these results.)
Indeed, many analysts agree that the reform failed to achieve its main targets (see Dell'Aringa,
2006).4
Possible reasons for the gap are that public sector workers are older, are better educated and
take managerial positions more frequently than in the private sector. In fact, taking into account
the signicant heterogeneity in the composition of the labour force (by age, gender, education and
occupational level) , the pay gap turns out to be lower but still sizeable.
Most of the papers that analyse the public-private pay gap in Italy using micro data are based
on the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which contains information
about personal and occupational characteristics, wages (net of income and payroll taxes) and type
of economic activity.
Among them, Bardasi (1996) looks at 1991 incomes. She uses a two-stage approach to take into
account the possibility that the distribution of people between sectors may not be random, but
rather result from self-selection. She nds a wage premium in the public sector of 9 and 35 per cent
for men and women, respectively. Although dierences in observable human capital characteristics
explain a small fraction of the overall gap, most of it is due to a residual component, which captures
dierences in compensation of given individual characteristics and the eect of geographical and
occupational dummies. Furthermore, self-selection seems to negatively aect the wage dierential,
above all for men. If workers were distributed randomly across sectors, the average wage in the
public sector would be 25 and 17 per cent higher for men and women, respectively.
Brunello - Dustmann (1997) compare public-private wage dierentials in Italy and in Germany.
As for Italian data, they use the 1993 wave of the SHIW; German data are from the German
Socio-Economic Panel and refer to 1989 incomes. They nd a positive wage gap in both countries,
higher in Italy than in Germany (21 and 7 per cent, respectively). Moreover, by decomposing the
dierential into two factors, one associated with individual characteristics and the other with price
dierentials, they nd that the positive dierence in Germany is entirely explained by the rst
factor, which more than osets a negative price dierential that is larger for workers with higher
education. In contrast, in Italy the compensation of dierent characteristics adds to a positive
price dierential that is higher for less educated workers. Therefore, they conclude that, for given
4Analyses on both the motivations and the eects of the 1993 reform are provided, among others, by Dell'Aringa
(1997) and Lucifora (1999).
8individual characteristics, public sector workers are penalized in Germany and rewarded in Italy.
According to the authors, their preliminary ndings do not reveal signicant sample selection biases.
Comi - Ghinetti - Lucifora (2002) analyse the gap over the period 1977-1998 using data from
the SHIW. They also nd a positive wage gap for the public sector that is higher for women and
for low-income workers. They observe that this dierence, after peaking in 1995 (20 per cent
for women, after controlling for individual characteristics), started decreasing in 1998. They also
explain the wage moderation in the public sector observed in the last part of their sample period
by mentioning the reform in the pay determination mechanisms introduced in 1993 to \privatize"
the employment relationship for most public sector employees.
Although gender is one key determinant of the public sector pay gap, the geographical hetero-
geneity also turns out to be substantial. An analysis of pay dierentials at regional level is provided
by Dell'Aringa - Lucifora - Origo (2007). They show that such dierentials, which vary signicantly
across Italian regions, are partly explained by local labour market conditions that in
uence wages
in the private sector and only marginally aect wages in the public sector. In the years 1991-2002 in
most regions in the North the gap, after controlling for individual and occupational characteristics,
turns out to be below 10 per cent, about 4-6 per cent in the largest and most industrialized areas
(Piemonte, Lombardia and Emilia Romagna). In contrast, in the southern regions the dierential
almost always exceeds 15 per cent, reaching 20-25 per cent in the regions characterized by high
unemployment and where public employment is widespread (Calabria and Sicilia).
Finally, Lucifora - Meurs (2006) investigate the public sector pay gap in 1998 in France, Great
Britain and Italy. They use the quantile regression (QR) method to analyse wage dierentials along
the wage distribution, and nd that the pay gap signicantly declines along it. The estimated wage
premium from the pooled model ranges between 10 and 12 per cent (lower when more control
variables are included in the specication) in the lowest deciles of the distribution, and is about
zero in the highest deciles (in the case of women the gap remains positive even at the top deciles,
while for men it turns negative in the upper part of the distribution). Quite surprisingly, when
conditioning on a larger set of variables they nd the highest premium in Great Britain (about
6 per cent on average), where the private sector wage is systematically used as a reference for
pay determination in the public sector. Estimates for France and Italy, where no application of
this comparability principle is in place, are lower and do not dier considerably from one another
(approximately 5 per cent).
To summarize, the presence of a wage gap in favour of the public sector in Italy is largely doc-
umented. The existing analyses, most of which focus on a particular year, show a wage dierential
generally exceeding 20 per cent for all employees, which decreases but remains quantitatively large
and signicant after controlling for the individual characteristics of the workers. The gap varies
a lot between men and women, workers with dierent educational and professional qualications
and across geographical areas. With the exception of Lucifora - Meurs (2006), these studies focus
on averages rather than on the entire distribution of wages and, with the exception of Bardasi
(1996) and Brunello - Dustmann (1997), they take the decision between private and public sector
as random. In contrast, we relax this assumption and consider the entire wage distribution.
3 The empirical strategy
In our analysis, in addition to Ordinary Least Square (OLS), we use quantile regression (QR) to
assess the value of the pay gap along the entire wage distribution.
9Indeed, there is in general no guarantee that the mean of a distribution successfully summarizes
all its relevant features. This is particularly true in the presence of outliers, as the results obtained
using standard approaches are very sensitive to them. Moreover, QR is useful when the impact of
explicative variables is dierent across dierent parts of the distribution as, in contrast to OLS, it
does not impose that covariates have the same eects over the entire distribution. In particular, we
employ the quantile regression methodology developed by Koenker - Bassett (1978). It consists of a
semi-parametric estimate that combines two parts: one is parametric and refers to the deterministic
part, i.e. the covariates; the other is non parametric and concerns the random residuals about which
no distributional assumption is imposed. In a simple model yi = xi + ui with i = 1;:::;N, when







jyi   xij +
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i2fi:yi<xig
(1   )jyi   xij
3
5:
Under some regularity conditions, the solution to the minimization problem gives a consistent
and asymptotically normal estimator.5 Moreover, it is shown that, whereas for a symmetric distri-
bution function median and mean regressions are equivalent, for a more complicated distribution
function the median regression is uniformly more ecient than the mean regression. For the present
study all these aspects are very useful and will be exploited throughout.
An additional concern that is related to our specic goal regards the exogeneity of the decision
to work in the public sector. Suppose for example that workers in the public sector are more risk
averse (Bellante - Link, 1981) and that managers in the private sector have more responsibility:
if we don't control for the amount of responsibility in the OLS and QR, we would estimate as a
\private premium" what is in fact compensation for responsibility. Of course, the opposite is also
true: if, for example, private companies give fringe benets to their workers as part of salary, we
would conclude that there exists a \public premium" if we don't control for the amount of non
monetary benets. Hence, endogeneity of sector choice can bias our estimates and can eventually
lead to a misunderstanding of the driving forces of the data generating process. It follows that the
assumption of exogeneity must be checked and cannot be imposed.
To our knowledge, the rst systematic treatment of endogeneity with median regression is due
to Amemiya (1982) who proposed a consistent estimator, whose asymptotic properties were further
generalized in Powell (1983). The approach is a two stage least absolute deviations (2SLAD) and
is analogous to the two stage least square (2SLS) for the mean.
More recently in a series of papers Chernozhukov - Hansen (2005) suggest a dual approach.
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where D is statistically dependent on the scalar random variable U that aggregates all the unob-
served factors aecting the structural outcome equation, X is a set of exogenous covariates and Z
is a set of instruments related to D, but independent on U. Thus, the true structural parameters 




10cannot be estimated with the usual quantile regression, but with an Instrumental Variable Quantile
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The spirit of the approach is that if we knew the true value of  we could obtain consistent
estimates using the ordinary quantile regression of y   D on X. Thus we can run a series of
quantile regressions for given values of  (grid search) to obtain
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(;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 as close to 0 as possible. More formally, we must nd a value of 
that satis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(;)0), so that Wn()
can be employed as the Wald statistic to test 
(;) = 0 (Chernozhukov - Hansen - Jansson, 2007).
The estimator is shown to be consistent and asymptotically normal as
p
n([ ^ (); ^ ()]0   [();()]0) !d: N(0;
);
for 
 as given in Chernozhukov - Hansen (2005). We conclude this section with a summary of the
four steps required to estimate the coecients:
1. dene a set of (j=1,...,J) values for ;
2. save the covariance matrix to be used for Wn(j);
3. choose the () that minimizes Wn() and obtain an estimate for ;
4. obtain the inference on  using 
.
Finally, note that this procedure works when the number of exogenous covariates is large, but the
number of endogenous covariates is small (typically one, as in our case, or two), because a grid
search is employed.
4 The data
Our data are taken from SHIW and refer to the period 1998{2008. Its target population is rep-
resentative of the Italian population; the sample consists of a small part followed over time (i.e.,
panel) and a larger part refreshed at each wave. To avoid a large drop in observations, we do not
exploit the distinction throughout the paper. The data contain information about a wide range
of personal and occupational characteristics (age, gender, marital status, educational level, region
of residency, sector of economic activity and occupational level), wages (net of income and payroll
taxes) and type of activity (rm size, part-time status, number of months worked in the year,
11average number of hours worked in a week). As for all survey data, the quality of SHIW is aected
by unit and item non-response. Unit non-response is sizeable (it amounts to about 50 per cent
of the selected households), whereas item non-response depends on the variable under study. The
rst issue is tackled by a post stratication weighting process, whereas the second issue is irrelevant
for employees and so the present study does not suer from these drawbacks. Furthermore, the
data quality is satisfactory when monetary aggregates are compared to Italian National Accounts
(Banca d'Italia, 2008).
One critical aspect related to this study concerns the identication of the public sector, which
can be dened using two dierent questions, one regarding the sector of economic activity and the
other categorized as rm size. In particular, a public worker can be identied when i) his/her sector
of activity is \public administration, defence, education, health and other public services" or, up to
2006, when ii) rm size \is not applicable, because public employee". We checked the robustness
of our results using both denitions, but the rest of the paper is based on sector of activity, as in
Lucifora - Meurs (2006).
Another issue is related to the choice of the appropriate variable for wage comparison. Indeed,
as the average number of hours worked in a week in the public sector (35) is lower than that
reported by workers in the private sector (39), using the monthly wage could underestimate the
wage dierential across sectors (we return to this issue in Section 5.5). Thus in our benchmark
specication we approximate the hourly wage as (Y W=M)=(4   H), where Y W is the yearly wage,
M the number of months worked in the year, and  H the average number of hours worked in a week.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
In this section we illustrate some descriptive statistics for key wage related characteristics of the
sample at hand. The statistics refer to employees aged 15{65, as is usual in this literature.
In Table 1 we tabulate the share of public sector workers in total employment by wave, gender
and area. We consider ve dierent areas: North West (NW), North East (NE), Centre (C), South
(S) and Islands (Is). Public sector employment in Italy is sizeable. It is more widespread among
women than among men, in the South and in the Islands than in the rest of the country and was
declining from 1998 to 2008. In our sample the percentage of public sector employment was 43.5%
for women and 28.5% for men in 1998, and went down to 35.4% and 20.9%, respectively, in 2008.6
The reduction occurred in all areas although in the North to a lesser extent, bringing about a
\convergence" towards a less dispersed range across areas. The gender gap remained constant over
time at about 14%, with again substantial dierences across areas.
In Tables 2{3 we report some descriptive statistics for individual characteristics for the pooled
1998{2008 sample (the same evidence emerges in each single year). In Table 2 we present summary
statistics for the entire distribution of the log of hourly wage and age. On average in Italy the
hourly wage in the private sector is higher in the sample of men than in the sample of women
by 12% (12% in the North East, 15% in North West, 16% in the Centre, 21% in the South and
3% in the Islands). If we focus on selected quantiles, the picture is even more dierentiated over
the territory: for example, in the South the gender gap is 25% at the 25th quantile, 21% at the
median and 19% at the 75th, i.e. decreasing over quantiles, whereas in the Centre it does not
6 In National Accounts data the fraction of public sector employees in total employment was equal to 20% in
2008. The dierence with our sample is likely due to the way in which the public sector is identied, in particular
the sample may include employees working outside general government, e.g. in education and health services.
12vary substantially along the wage distribution (15% at the 25th and 75th quantiles and 16% at
the median). In the public sector the gender gap is smaller than in the private sector: 4% as the
national average, positive in the North and in the Islands, and negative or zero in the Centre and
in the South.
More important for the purposes of our analysis is the comparison of wages across sectors. On
average the wage gap is in favour of the public sector by 34% for women and 25% for men; it is 30%
and 36% at the 25th and the 75th quantile for women and 21% and 26% respectively for men. In
the sample of women it is less than 30% in the North and much higher in the Centre (36%), in the
South (55%) and in the Islands (41%). In the sample of men these dierences are smaller: 20{25%
in the North and in the Centre, slightly higher than 30% in the South and 40% in the Islands. Thus
not only the gender gap, but also the private-public pay gap diers signicantly across regions.
A graphical summary of these characteristics is presented in Figure 2. In panel a) we show
the Kernel density estimation of the (log of) hourly distribution by gender and sector; the lower
panel reports the cumulative distribution functions. In panel b) we x the gender to compare the
(unconditional) sector wage dierential: it is quite clear that the horizontal distance between the
two curves in the sample of women is larger than in the sample of men, with the public sector
cumulative distribution function lying to the right of the private sector cumulative distribution
function (i.e. at each quantile the wage is higher in the public sector than in the private sector);
moreover, the dierence tends to be larger at higher quantiles than at others. In panel c) we x
the sector: it is clear that the horizontal dierence is larger in the private sector than in the public
sector, with the curve for men lying to the right of the curve referring to women in the private
sector (i.e., at each quantile men earn more than women), and virtually overlapping in the public
sector.
Turning to workers' characteristics, the age of men and women is similar within each sector
(with men being on average older by 1{2 years), but the dierence across sectors is sizeable: on
average public sector employees are older by about 5{7 years. Other workers' characteristics are
reported in Table 3. The share of married individuals is higher amongst public sector employees
than that in the private sector. More relevant to the wage process are education and job position.
Public employees are better educated.7 The fraction of women with a graduate or post-graduate
degree is 32% in the public sector as against 8% in the private sector; for men it is 23% and 7%,
respectively. The educational gap is observed in all geographical areas, but is wider in Southern
regions. As for job position, the vast majority of both men and women are white collar workers in
the public sector (up to 92% of women and 81% of men in the South), and blue collar workers in
the private sector, with relative frequencies changing widely across areas. As expected, the fraction
of managers is the lowest in both sectors, both for men and for women: it is three times as much
in the public sector than in the private sector for men (7% as against 2%); it is 3% in the public
sector and negligible in the private sector for women. In general, in the public sector occupational
positions seem more favourable than in the private sector in relation to educational attainments,
above all for men and in the Southern regions. In Italy the fraction of men with intermediate
or high education is 71%, the fraction of white collar workers and managers is 85% in the public
sector; the shares are 49% and 32%, respectively, in the private sector. For women the dierences
across sectors are less striking: the share of workers with intermediate and high education is 86%,
that of white collar workers and managers is 87% in the public sector, as opposed to shares equal
7 In the table the gures for education do not sum up to 1 because they do not include the share of individuals
with minimal education.
13to 57% and 48% in the private sector. Finally, part time jobs are observed more frequently for
women than for men, who almost never work part-time, and in the private sector more than in the
public sector.
Given the high variability in job position across areas, gender and sectors, in Table 4 we enrich
the analysis of hourly wage by also looking at the position. Table 4 shows that the greatest pay
dierential between men and women is for private sector managers, whereas for private sector blue
and white collar workers the dierence is about 13{15%. Such dierences are much smaller in the
public sector (for example, the gender dierence for white collar workers is virtually zero). As for
the public-private pay gap, it is highest for white collar women workers, in particular those living in
the South and in the Islands. For men the premium is generally lower and negative for managers.
So far we have documented a public sector pay gap by gender, job position and geographical area;
the interesting question is now whether it persists even after controlling for relevant characteristics
determining the wage process. We do this in the rest of the paper.
5 The results
In this section we present the model specication (Section 5.1) and our empirical ndings on the
wage gap in Italy. In Section 5.2 we report the results under random sampling, based on quantile
and ordinary least square regressions; in Section 5.3 we remove the assumption of random sampling
and control for possible endogeneity of the decision to work in the public sector with the earning
process.
5.1 The model
To investigate the public sector pay gap we estimate a standard wage equation, extensively used
in previous studies:
lnWit = Xit + PUBit + it; (1)
where lnWit is the log of hourly wages (net of income and payroll taxes) of individual i at time t,
Xit is a vector of individual characteristics, PUB is a dummy variable, which takes the value one
if the individual works in the public sector,  and  are vectors of parameters, and it is an error
term.
We focus on the coecient attached to PUB, which is the \return on public sector". Other
things being equal, if the coecient is positive there exists a wage gap in favour of the public sector.
Estimating equation 1 using OLS, or QR, yields consistent estimates if and only if the distribu-
tion of workers between the two sectors is random and the vector X consists of exogenous variables.
In fact, the distribution of people between the two sectors may not be random, but rather depend
on the unobserved individual characteristics of the workers, such as dierent aptitude for risk or
dierent preference for time 
exibility; workers might also be heterogeneous across sectors with
respect to the gratication that they derive from dierent types of jobs (e.g., they may desire to
be a civil servant or work in the non-prot sector) and thus self-select according to those features;
nally, there may be other factors, both monetary and non-monetary, such as fringe benets, oc-
cupational pension benets, job tenure or wage variability, that can contribute to explain wage
dierentials. In these situations, interpreting the wage gap as a \premium" or a \penalty" may not
be appropriate, unless a correction is made.
14Hence, we begin our analysis by making the assumption of random sampling, as most of the
literature has done so far. We then relax this assumption and address the possibility of non-random
sampling. From the previous section it should be clear that the wage dierential may dier along
the wage distribution; thus the following analysis is on selected quantiles as well as on the mean.
5.2 Random sampling
In Table 5 we present the estimates obtained with QR and OLS using data for all employees, and
distinguishing by gender. We report only the coecients attached to the public sector, although the
regressions are conditional on a set of characteristics, namely: age (a second degree polynomial);
marital status; educational level (a set of dummies for basic education, i.e. primary school, lower
secondary school, which corresponds to compulsory school under Italian law, higher secondary
school, and BA or post-graduate degree); job position (a set of dummies for blue collar workers,
white collar workers and managers); whether part-time or not; geographical area; and year.8 The
reference individual is 40 years old, with a BA, working in the private sector as a full-time white
collar worker in central Italy and observed in 2008.
The average dierential is 14% for women and much lower for men, about 4%. However,
further insights can be gained from the investigation of the complete distribution of the conditional
wages. Indeed, the dierential varies along the wage distribution and a formal test of equality
of slope coecients across quantiles rejects the null hypothesis at standard condence levels (the
F-statistics are 3.03 with a P-value of 0.002 for women and 9.75 with a P-value of 0.000 for men).
As usual, much of the heterogeneity is on the tails of the distribution. For women, the dierential
ranges between 17% at the 10th quantile and 12% at the 90th: it declines fast between the 10th
and the 30th quantile (from 17% to less than 12%) then it remains constant between the 40th
and the 90th quantiles at about 12{13%, such that a formal statistical test does not reject the
null hypothesis of the equality of slope coecients between these quantiles. Unlike for women, the
dierential for men exhibits a clear decreasing pattern from lower to higher quantiles: it is 10% at
the 10th quantile, less than 5% at the median, 2.5% at the 60th quantile and not really signicant
from the 70th onward.
The gender dierence is on average 10% with important variation across quantiles. Although
working in the public sector is more rewarding for women than for men at all quantiles, the gender
dierence increases along the wage distribution: it is about 5% at the 10th quantile, and is above
10% from the 60th quantile onward. This appears clearly in Figure 3 a), where the maximum
(vertical) distance between the two lines is at the right-hand side of the graph.
By splitting the sample between dierent geographical areas and occupational qualications,
other interesting features emerge from the analysis.
By geographical area, in relation to the sample of women, there is a dierential in favour of the
public sector in all areas that generally increases going from the North to the Centre and to the
South of Italy. On average in the last decade the dierential for women has been about 10% in the
North, 15% in the Centre, 29% in the South and 18% in the Islands. Along the wage distribution,
the pattern in each area resembles that observed in Italy as a whole. For men, the pay gap is almost
always positive along the wage distribution in the North East, in the South and in the Islands (on
average equal to 4%, 7% and 13%, respectively). In the North West and in the Centre it is not
8 All complete estimates described in this and the following sections are available from the authors upon request.
15signicant on average; in the North West at high quantiles working in the public sector entails a
negative rather than a positive dierential.
The other important conditioning is on position, for both blue collar and white collar jobs,
where interesting dierences emerge by gender.9 For blue collar women workers the conditional
earning dierential in favour of the public sector is decreasing from lower to upper quantiles, and
generally much smaller than for white collar workers (the mean averaging at 9%, as against 16% for
white collar workers). For men, instead, while the decreasing pattern along the wage distribution is
common to both white collars and blue collars, the wage dierentials in favour of the public sector
is higher for blue collar workers than for white collar workers (on average 8% and 4%, respectively);
at higher quantiles, the pay gap is not signicantly dierent from zero at standard condence level.
According to these results, there is an advantage to working in the public sector that is greater
for women than for men. For women it is positive in all geographical areas and generally higher in
the Centre and in the South. For men the pay gap is virtually zero in the North and the Centre of
Italy, whereas it is positive in the South and in the Islands; the pay gap decreases along the wage
distribution: at high quantiles no pay advantage, and in some cases even negative dierentials are
found.
However, these results must be evaluated with care because of a possible endogeneity between
the decision to work in the public sector decision and the earning process. We try to resolve this
issue in the rest of the paper.
5.3 Non random sampling
In this section we specically address the possibility of non random sampling across sectors. We
rst focus on the mean; then, making use of the techniques discussed in Section 3, we analyse the
quantiles adopting a two steps procedure. The rst step purges the endogeneity between public
sector choice and the earning process, and the second step uses the projection of the sector decision
obtained in the rst step to estimate the premium, along with a grid search. The grid ranges
between -1 and +1 (i.e., 100% penalty/premium) with a step of 0.01. Consistent estimates are
obtained based on valid exclusion restrictions, i.e. i) restrictions that in
uence the probability of
working in the public sector, and ii) restrictions that are uncorrelated with the earning process.
Almost all the existing literature uses only variables related to parents' sector of occupation as
instruments for sector sorting, mainly due to data limitations. There are several reasons to control
for the parents' sector of occupation, beside the fact that it is uncorrelated with the individual's
wage level: i) the family background may shape the preferences of an individual to work in one
sector or another; ii) the opportunity for some workers to leave their own job and be replaced by
their children may be relevant, especially in the Italian context; iii) the connections built up by
parents during their working career may be important channels to enter one sector or the other.
Among the studies focussing on Italian data, Brunello - Dustmann (1997) argue that the job of
the fathers is key for the job of the children. We investigated also the role played by the job of
the mothers, jointly with that of the fathers. The results (available upon request) do not change
signicantly; however, due to a large number of missing data on the job of the mothers, we decided
not to consider this information. On the other hand, Bardasi (1996) argues that public sector
workers are more risk averse and value stability more and thus chooses home ownership and the
9 We do not compare the public sector pay gap for managers along the quantiles because very few of them are in
the lower part of the distribution.
16presence of children as exclusion restrictions.
Undoubtedly family background, risk aversion and preference for stability are all convincing
exclusion restrictions. Thus, we exploit a detailed set of information available in SHIW regarding
the father's job, home ownership together with the presence of children (hereafter home-related
variables), as well as a direct measure of the attitude to taking nancial risks, which was never
taken into account in previous studies.10 Unfortunately while the latter may be a better proxy
of risk aversion than home-related variables, it has only been available since 2004 and, due to
questionnaire design, only for a smaller subset of respondents. As a consequence, when we use this
information the sample size shrinks dramatically.
Furthermore, our dataset allows us to control for two other possible motivations not yet explored
by the existing literature, although only for wave 2004. One is the rate of time preference, that
may aect people's choice to join one sector or the other. We expect that a lower discount rate
increases the probability to be a public sector worker, as deferred salaries, in the form of pension
benets, are in Italy generally more generous in the public sector. The other instrument measures
the propensity of the individual to be engaged in active pro-social activity and is meant to capture
the importance of a pro-social motivation to work in the public sector.11 Although controlling for
such additional motivations limits our analysis to a single year (2004), the exercise is important for
two reasons: on the one hand including other possible motivations allows us to evaluate whether
the existing practice to control for family background alone is valid or not in the case of Italy (we
test whether it is a good assumption or not, rather than assume that it is a good assumption); on
the other hand we can sort the importance of motivations.
5.3.1 Sorting the sector of activity
In the rst step we regress the public sector indicator on exogenous covariates and exclusion re-
strictions: fathers' sector of occupation, risk attitude measured by both home-related variables and
our direct measure of risk aversion, discounting preferences and pro-social vocation. In Table 6 we
report the coecients for the exclusion restrictions estimated using the whole sample: columns \Fa-
ther" and \Home" present the results obtained when family background or home-related variables
are considered one at a time; column \Father & Home" when family background and home-related
variables are included together. Similarly, in Table 7 we report the coecients for the exclusion re-
strictions for year 2004; we also include columns \Discount", \Risk" and \Social", which present the
results for discount rate, risk aversion and pro-social motivation, respectively. The column FHDRS
reports the results obtained when all possible exclusion restrictions are accounted for, but since the
inclusion of R implies a large loss of observations, we consider FHDS as the most inclusive.
10The exact wording of the question for risk aversion is: \When managing your nancial investments, would
you describe yourself as someone who looks for:" and four possible responses are oered: \VERY HIGH returns,
regardless of a HIGH risk of losing part of your capital" to \LOW returns, WITHOUT any RISK of losing your
capital", which we recoded in high vs low risk aversion.
11 The exact wording for the rate of time preference is \Imagine you were told you had won on the lottery the
equivalent of your households net annual income. The sum will be paid to you in a year's time. However, if you
give up part of the sum you can have the rest immediately", and ve possible answers regarding the fraction the
respondent is willing to give up are envisaged. The exact wording for pro-social activity is \In the last year, have
you taken an active part in gatherings of any of the following groups or associations: associations/groups involved in
social, environmental, union policy, religious, cultural, sports or recreational, professional, or voluntary activities?",
and a YES/NO answer.
17In what follows, we focus our comments on the exogeneity and relevance of instruments, which
are the two essential requisites for the IV technique.12 As for the former, given that in general we
have more exclusion restrictions than endogenous variables, we can test the over-identifying restric-
tions for the validity of our instruments (J-test; Hansen, 1982). For the relevance of instruments
we take advantage of the recent contribution by Stock - Yogo (2005).
When we consider all the years, the test rejects the orthogonality condition for \Home" and
\Father & Home", for both men and women. When using \Father" we have one endogenous
variable and one instrument and, thus, we cannot test for the over-identifying restrictions (Hansen,
1982); nevertheless, to test how good family background is as an instrument, we have computed
the J-test for the case in which the mother's sector of occupation is also considered. The result of
the J-test, not shown to avoid confusion, supports the idea that family background is a good set
of instruments because it meets the orthogonality condition (the J-test for women is 1.346 with a
P-value of 0.246, while for men is 1.797 with a P-value of 0.180).
To evaluate the relevance of our instruments we use the F-statistic as proposed by Stock - Yogo
(2005). As a rule of thumb, with one endogenous variable the F-statistic for joint signicance
of exclusion restrictions is above 10 if instruments are relevant, below if they are weak. The F-
statistic for \Father" is always the highest and well above the threshold. \Home" on its own is a
weak indicator for sorting in the public sector for men, as the test is below 10. However, when we
consider both \Father" and \Home" the test for the joint signicance of the instruments is always
larger than 10.
The results clearly show that \Father" is an appropriate instrument: it satises all the properties
required by IV technique for consistent estimation. The coecients reported in Table 6 suggest
that having a father in the public sector signicantly increases the probability of working in the
same sector for both men and women.
Finally, in order to evaluate whether adding the other instruments improves the eciency of the
estimator, we perform the redundancy test (Breusch - Qian - Schmidt - Wyhowski, 1999), which
basically consists of the comparison of the variances of the estimators based on dierent sets of
instruments: a particular set of instruments is redundant if its inclusion does not reduce the variance
of the estimator. The entries in Table 6 are calculated exclusively on the column \Father & Home",
because \the potential ambiguity [in ascertain redundant instruments] encountered in a start small
approach does not occur in a start big approach" (Breusch - Qian - Schmidt - Wyhowski, 1999,
p. 99). Thus, in the column \Father" the redundancy of the family background instrument based
on estimates from the column \Father & Home" is tested; in the column \Home" the redundancy
of home ownership and children based on estimates from the column \Father & Home" is tested.
Neither \Father", nor \Home" are redundant, with the statistic from \Father" much larger than
that from \Home".
The redundancy test conrms that \Father" is a valid instrument. At the same time, home-
related variables, although non redundant, fail to pass the other tests (exogeneity and relevance).
We conclude the section with a focus on the year 2004, which aims at evaluating whether
additional information can be exploited using other instruments. Indeed, for year 2004 we can
control for a larger set of motivations. Except for FHDRS for women and FHDS for men, all our
instruments are valid as they meet the requisite for consistent estimates. Focussing on the additional
12 We performed these analyses on conditional mean, as this theory for quantiles is not yet established and
extending it is beyond the scope of the paper. Notice however that this rst step is common to both IV and IVQR
techniques.
18exclusion restrictions only, the discount rate variables (in the \Discount" column) do not have much
explanatory power (individually they are not signicant not even at the 10% condence level) and
come with the wrong sign. The risk attitude when investing in nancial markets (col. \Risk") is
important for men but not for women. Although in this case the sample size is reduced due to
questionnaire design, we will borrow from this evidence to suggest a possible interpretation of the
results that we obtain under the hypothesis of endogeneity. Finally, pro-social motivation (in the
\Social" column) is signicant for women at the 5% condence level, but largely insignicant for
men. Moreover, for women home-related and pro-social instruments are not redundant at the 10%
condence level (note however that the size of the sample including the pro-social variable is small).
For men, the null hypothesis of redundancy is strongly rejected for \Father", \Father & Home"
and \Risk", whereas \Discount" and \Social" are redundant other than weak. By and large these
robustness checks support the standard practice of using only the family background as exclusion
restrictions. Interestingly, however, pro-social indicators appear to increase the probability to be
employed in the public sector for women only, whereas risk aversion helps in explaining the sector
choice only for men.
Summing up, according to our tests, the relevant set of instruments is conrmed to be family
background as proxied by the sector of activity of the father: leaving aside this restriction brings
to weak identication and prevents all the asymptotic properties for a correct identication to be
matched.
For these reasons we now study the public-private sector pay gap focussing on the family
background (\Father") as our instrument.
5.4 The pay gap
Based on this background we can now study the public sector pay gap. In Table 8 we report the
results using \Father" and \Father & Home" to instrument the worker's sector of activity. We
investigate averages as well as all quantiles as we did for the exogenous case. In what follows, we
rst present the results and then we comment on them. For women the conditional pay dierential
is on average about 40% when we consider \Father" and 60% when we consider \Father & Home".
For men, the conditional pay gap is 34% when we instrument the sector of activity using \Father"
and 39% when we consider \Father & Home": in both cases it is lower than that estimated for
the sample of women. Also over quantiles, notwithstanding the lack of precision at the very end of
the wage distribution,13 the dierentials in favour of the public sector are larger when we control
for additional motivations than under the exogenous case. When using \Father", for both women
and men the pay gap is larger by approximately 20 percentage points up to the median, and by
something between 30 and 45 percentage points between the 60th and the 80th quantile. The same
pattern along the wage distribution, shifted up, is found when using \Father & Home" together.
The main message that we can draw from this analysis is that, whatever the set of instruments,
the assumption of random sampling tends to underestimate the true dierential, both at averages
and over quantiles, suggesting that the results obtained assuming exogeneity of sector choice must
be viewed with caution. More formally, based on the classical Hausman (1978) test, the coecients
estimated under the assumption of exogeneity are found to be statistically dierent from those
obtained under non random sampling (at the standard condence level).
13 Larger standard errors derive from the presence of the density function in the variance formula, which tends to
make the objective function less precise in the regions of low density (Koenker, 2005, p. 72).
19As an attempt to further understand these results, we investigate where, along the wage distribu-
tion, the endogeneity bias exerts its main power. Following Angrist - Chernozhukov - Fernandez-Val
(2006), the bias of the QR estimates due to omitted variables, like family background in our case,
depends on the (weighted) correlation between the public sector choice and a remainder term, which
incorporates family background. As can be seen from a comparison of the estimated coecients,
with and without correction for sector choice endogeneity, in general the bias increases from lower to
higher quantiles, suggesting that, other things being equal, the sorting process is more important at
high quantiles than at low quantiles, i.e. precisely at those quantiles where previous studies found
lower or negative dierentials. To provide an overall picture of the bias, in Figure 4 we plot the
dierences between the coecients obtained controlling and without controlling for sorting. The
bias for men is similar in size to that for women, and clearly increases along the quantiles, except
at the very right end.
The size of the correction and its increasing pattern along the wage distribution raise two
questions. Is the size of the correction and, consequently, of the dierential credible? What is the
source of its increasing pattern?14 Obviously the robustness of coecient estimates to dierent
sets of instruments is a strength for the sample of men; on the other hand, the variability of the
coecients for women suggests that the estimates for this group have to be viewed with caution.
Indeed, for women other forms of sorting in addition to the private/public sector decision might be
relevant, in particular the preliminary decision to enter the work force or not. However, taking this
into account requires a dierent model, as our results are valid conditional on individuals being
employed. The literature either removed this problem by focussing on men, as in Dustmann -
Van Soest (1998) who raised the issue explicitly, or completely ignored it. This said, even a wage
dierential in the order of 30{40% as estimated for the sample of men may be too large. However, in
the following section we will present the estimates based on dierent measures of job compensation
and rm sizes that, on the one hand, conrm as a general result the underestimation bias under
the assumption of exogeneity and, on the other hand, point to lower conditional pay dierentials.
As for the second question, we suggest the following interpretation for our ndings. At the low
quantiles of the earning distribution what really matters is the monetary motivation, so that the
bias for not controlling for the sorting mechanism is relatively small. In contrast, at the high earning
quantiles other factors, related to family background, also matter and the bias from not controlling
for them leads to quite imprecise conclusions. A possible explanation for these ndings might hinge
on the results presented in Table 7 that suggest that risk aversion for men and pro-social attitude
for women matter for sorting in the public sector. In particular, we found that for men the risk
aversion motivation is more important at the higher wage levels where one is more likely to have
to take decisions, particularly in the private sector (the results are available upon request). Such a
higher responsibility might explain the larger correction at the higher quantiles for men. Also for
women the impact of pro-social propensity on the choice of sector increases with the wage level.
However, in this case, we could not nd any convincing argument to explain the evidence. Of
course, given that our analysis is based on the variable \Father" as the only instrument for sector
14 Although there is evidence for the US that blue collar workers are willing to queue to obtain public sector jobs,
whereas highly skilled workers are hard to recruit and retain in the public sector (Katz - Krueger, 1991), for Italy
we are not aware of any quantitative analysis exploring this issue. However, informal observation seems to suggest
that workers are willing to queue to obtain public sector jobs above all in Southern Italy, where educational choices
at graduate level also appear to be in
uenced, among other things, by their relative ability to yield a position in the
public sector.
20choice, this interpretation holds as long as family background, by shaping individual preferences,
is also able to capture risk aversion and pro-social attitudes.
Unfortunately, we cannot investigate the dierential by geographical area and/or by job po-
sition with the IVQR technique. Indeed this technique is appropriate only when the number of
endogenous variables is one or two at most, and the alternative solution of splitting the sample
would substantially reduce the number of observations.
5.5 Robustness checks
Our previous results are persuasive, but can be questioned on several counts. First of all, the
economic theory beyond the Mincerian equation uses experience, not age, as proxy for the human
capital accumulation. We should thus also control for experience instead of age in our estimation
of the wage equation. Second, public sector wage dierentials may only be found compared with
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), that are more likely to adopt bad practices in violation of
contractual rules, such as gender discrimination and use of undeclared employment. This problem
may be addressed by controlling for rm size. Third, we have performed our analysis using the
hourly wage as a measure of workers' compensation, while one can argue that, as long as the hours
worked are not a choice variable of the worker, monthly earnings better represents the remuneration
that is possibly more important for the employees.
Although our choices are common in the existing literature, in this section we investigate the
robustness of our previous conclusions to these potential drawbacks. In the spirit of a robustness
check, in Table 9 we present only the results of the analysis on the means (those obtained for
quantiles are available upon request).
The upper panel of the table is built under the assumption of exogenous sector decision, whereas
the lower panel reports the results obtained when this assumption is removed and the sector of
activity of the fathers is used as the instrument for the public sector dummy.
As is clear from the rst columns (denoted by \Exp."), for both women and men using experience
instead of age as proxy for the human capital accumulation does not change the public sector
dierential signicantly, re
ecting the fact that labour experience and age are highly correlated.
Under exogeneity there exists a positive wage dierential for public sector workers of about 13.6%
for women and 3.9% for men (14.1% for women and 4.2% for men, respectively, using age); when
we allow for sector sorting, the dierential increases by about 25 percentage points for women and
men, to 0.38 and 0.31, respectively (the coecient is 0.39 for women and 0.34 for men using age).
The other two issues are somewhat peculiar to the Italian case. To address the rst issue,
related to rm size, we have included in our specication two sector indicators: one for small
private rms, one for large private rms. The coecient of the former (latter) will measure the pay
gap between small (large) rms and the public sector, thus a negative coecient will be estimated
if the pay gap is in favour of the public sector workers.15 We have dened the rm as large if
it employs more than 100 workers. The results reported in the second column (\Big Ent.") are
15 If the public sector is more directly comparable to large private rms than to the private sector as a whole,
another approach to estimate the pay gap is to split the sample. Using this approach, under random sampling we nd
no (signicant) dierential for women and a signicative negative dierential for men, thus supporting the insight that
our results are in some sense \driven" by the SMEs. However, when we correct for possible sorting, for women the
point estimate (0.35) is smaller but close to the benchmark presented in Section 5.4 (0.39), although it is estimated
rather imprecisely; for men we obtain a lower but still largely signicant dierential in favour of the public sector
workers (the point estimate is now 0.23).
21interesting. Indeed workers of large private rms are better o than workers of small private rms
in all cases, but public sector workers are better o than both of them in the sample of women,
under the assumption of exogeneity. When we control for possible sorting, for women the pay gap
in favour of the public sector becomes larger, irrespective of rm size, although the magnitude of
the correction is smaller than in the benchmark case. When we consider men, the correction makes
the pay gap larger, only if compared with small rms, whereas men working in large private rms
are better o than those working in the public sector. However if we allow for a more 
exible model
specication, where each coecient is interacted with the rm size dummies, the pay gap for men
is again estimated in favour of public sector workers, irrespective of whether they are compared
with small or large rms' workers. As a consequence, the evidence for men working in large rms
is not clear cut.
Finally, in the last columns of Table 9 we report the results obtained when monthly, instead
of hourly, wage is our dependent variable controlling and not controlling for the number of hours
usually worked per week (\Monthly" and \Monthly - No Hours", respectively). In both cases,
all estimated dierentials are lower than in our benchmark specications. While for women the
gap always remains always positive and signicant, for men a dierential in favour of private sector
workers emerges under exogeneity. When we consider the possible sorting in the employment sector,
all our qualitative previous conclusions are re-established. As expected, the dierential in favour
of the public sector is larger when we control for the number of hours worked per week.16
6 Conclusions and nal remarks
In this paper we studied the public private sector pay gap in Italy in the period 1998{2008, using
micro data from the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth. Compared to previous
studies on Italy that control for relevant characteristics of employment, this paper provided an
updated analysis that evaluates the wage dierential in the last decade.
Unlike most of the existing literature that focuses on the average dierential, we analysed the
entire distribution of (log) wage, by using conditional quantile regression techniques, and properly
considered the possible endogeneity of the sector choice. Because the performance and the validity
of IV estimators crucially depends on the exogeneity and relevance of instruments, we investigated
several possible motivations invoked in the literature as key to enter the public sector. By exploiting
a rich set of information provided in the 2004 wave of the Survey, we were able to discuss whether
certain characteristics of employees, such as family background, risk aversion, degree of forward-
lookingness and preferences for pro-social activities increase the probability that they will seek
employment in the public sector. As a measure of risk aversion we considered the presence of
children and home ownership, as in the existing literature, as well as the attitude of the respondent
to taking nancial risks; to assess the degree of forward-lookingness or impatience we relied on direct
measures of discounting; as an indicator of altruistic vocation we controlled for the engagement of
the respondent into pro-social voluntary activities; nally, as for family background we accounted
for the parents' sector of occupation.
16The issue here is the well-known omitted variable bias: if the true model is y = x + z
 + u, but we estimate




). Because employees in the public sector work, on average, less hours than in
the private sector (less than 35 as opposed to 39 hours per week in the main job), then x
0z < 0, hence the estimated
coecient will be smaller than the true coecient (with 
 > 0).
22In fact, sample selection appears to play a key role. On the one hand, under the assumption of
random sector choice, quantile and mean regressions pointed to a pay dierential in favour of the
public sector workers averaging at about 14 per cent for women and 4 per cent for men. At the
bottom quantiles the gap is slightly higher for women than for men; then it decreases substantially
along the conditional wage distribution for men, whereas it remains relatively constant for women,
so that the gender gap increases towards higher quantiles. The dierence is generally higher for
white collar workers (while managers in the public sector seem to be at an earning disadvantage
with respect to those in the private sector), and in Southern Italy.
On the other hand, when we controlled for possible endogeneity of the sector choice we obtained
substantially higher gaps, suggesting that additional motives, other than monetary ones, may
induce people to seek employment in the public sector and that ignoring them may result in an
underestimation of the overall advantage. Such additional motivations, which for men could be
related to dierent propensities across sectors to take risks, appeared to be particularly signicant
above the median of the wage distribution, precisely where previous studies used to nd lower
premia or even penalties.
These results are robust to a dierent model specication (i.e., using labour experience instead
of age as the proxy for human capital accumulation) and when considering monthly wages as
opposed to hourly wages. Instead, when we restricted our comparison to large rms only, a pay
dierential in favour of public sector workers was conrmed for the sample of women, whereas for
men no clear-cut evidence was found.
Using up-to-date techniques, we have documented the existence of a signicant public sector pay
gap in Italy. However, drawing from the analysis specic policy implications, such as dierentiated
pay by geographical area or by gender or horizontal wage cuts in the public sector, is far beyond
our intention.
Moreover, we have said little or nothing about causes and consequences of such a dierential.
Nonetheless, understanding whether the public-private pay gap simply depends on institutional
features, or rather re
ects the true preferences of the policy-makers, and what its implications are
for the quality of public services as well as for educational choices and labour market developments
is of crucial importance. Thus, we take the analysis in this paper as a necessary intermediate step
and leave the other questions for future research.
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26Table 1: The evolution of public sector over time. Relative frequencies
Area 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Women
NW 0.370 0.354 0.365 0.385 0.349 0.328
NE 0.340 0.314 0.302 0.333 0.320 0.311
C 0.456 0.397 0.422 0.313 0.398 0.368
S 0.572 0.537 0.489 0.491 0.472 0.403
IS 0.674 0.547 0.601 0.515 0.599 0.460
ITALY 0.432 0.394 0.397 0.379 0.388 0.354
Men
NW 0.207 0.190 0.182 0.207 0.186 0.157
NE 0.178 0.184 0.180 0.159 0.127 0.136
C 0.357 0.272 0.318 0.239 0.250 0.231
S 0.397 0.359 0.331 0.324 0.352 0.271
IS 0.313 0.287 0.316 0.321 0.351 0.320
ITALY 0.283 0.251 0.255 0.239 0.237 0.209
Total
ITALY 0.344 0.309 0.314 0.297 0.302 0.273
27Table 2: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables, by Area, Gender and Sector.
Variable Area Mean SD p25 p50 p75 Mean SD p25 p50 p75
Women
Private Public
Ln(Wage) NW 1.969 0.404 1.757 1.945 2.153 2.245 0.415 1.980 2.194 2.456
NE 1.946 0.378 1.731 1.924 2.120 2.240 0.412 1.987 2.181 2.444
C 1.912 0.427 1.683 1.889 2.120 2.269 0.405 2.011 2.227 2.504
S 1.691 0.543 1.395 1.689 1.970 2.238 0.499 1.984 2.252 2.519
IS 1.818 0.450 1.581 1.833 2.092 2.228 0.470 1.958 2.181 2.510
ITALY 1.910 0.432 1.683 1.913 2.120 2.246 0.435 1.987 2.200 2.477
Age NW 37.7 9.9 30.0 38.0 45.0 42.0 8.5 36.0 42.0 48.0
NE 36.7 9.9 29.0 36.0 44.0 40.6 8.7 34.0 41.0 47.0
C 37.9 9.8 30.0 38.0 44.0 43.4 9.4 37.0 42.0 51.0
S 37.2 10.6 29.0 37.0 45.0 44.2 9.2 38.0 44.0 51.0
IS 37.5 10.4 29.0 37.0 45.0 43.2 9.2 36.0 43.0 50.0
ITALY 37.4 10.0 29.0 37.0 45.0 42.5 9.0 36.0 42.0 49.0
Men
Private Public
Ln(Wage) NW 2.116 0.406 1.873 2.063 2.343 2.345 0.430 2.067 2.288 2.558
NE 2.064 0.375 1.864 2.046 2.238 2.356 0.439 2.075 2.280 2.560
C 2.071 0.436 1.833 2.056 2.270 2.265 0.438 2.005 2.200 2.506
S 1.900 0.475 1.650 1.913 2.161 2.214 0.434 1.970 2.189 2.397
IS 1.852 0.505 1.581 1.865 2.120 2.285 0.389 2.081 2.238 2.449
ITALY 2.031 0.438 1.808 2.019 2.238 2.282 0.432 2.019 2.226 2.498
Age NW 38.8 10.2 31.0 39.0 46.0 43.8 9.2 37.0 45.0 51.0
NE 37.0 10.1 29.0 37.0 44.0 43.0 8.7 37.0 43.0 50.0
C 39.6 10.8 31.0 39.0 48.0 43.9 10.0 37.0 44.0 51.0
S 39.1 11.2 30.0 39.0 48.0 45.6 9.8 40.0 46.0 53.0
IS 38.2 11.4 29.0 38.0 47.0 45.8 9.4 39.0 46.0 52.0
ITALY 38.5 10.6 30.0 38.0 46.0 44.5 9.6 38.0 45.0 52.0
28Table 3: Descriptive statistics for dichotomous variables, by Area, Gender and Sector.
Area Sector Married Education Positions Partime Obs.
Low Int. High Blue White Man.
Women
NW Private 0.583 0.331 0.511 0.090 0.455 0.539 0.006 0.198 2515
Public 0.714 0.139 0.529 0.310 0.170 0.790 0.041 0.085 1516
NE Private 0.560 0.332 0.541 0.064 0.521 0.476 0.003 0.263 2549
Public 0.669 0.118 0.580 0.285 0.143 0.833 0.024 0.161 1286
C Private 0.544 0.374 0.488 0.080 0.538 0.456 0.006 0.235 1988
Public 0.629 0.112 0.525 0.347 0.128 0.833 0.039 0.061 1221
S Private 0.501 0.333 0.382 0.086 0.654 0.343 0.003 0.279 1112
Public 0.668 0.089 0.533 0.338 0.062 0.918 0.020 0.061 1215
IS Private 0.476 0.363 0.451 0.051 0.599 0.399 0.003 0.328 573
Public 0.637 0.149 0.549 0.284 0.100 0.883 0.017 0.119 633
ITALY Private 0.553 0.342 0.495 0.078 0.523 0.472 0.005 0.241 8737
Public 0.670 0.120 0.542 0.315 0.128 0.842 0.031 0.095 5871
Men
NW Private 0.599 0.377 0.442 0.100 0.608 0.365 0.027 0.016 3864
Public 0.758 0.240 0.426 0.314 0.140 0.751 0.109 0.019 951
NE Private 0.581 0.408 0.477 0.057 0.689 0.294 0.017 0.017 3644
Public 0.707 0.194 0.514 0.274 0.142 0.771 0.087 0.036 778
C Private 0.595 0.402 0.443 0.082 0.620 0.345 0.035 0.027 3034
Public 0.740 0.282 0.473 0.219 0.172 0.764 0.064 0.019 1113
S Private 0.664 0.443 0.351 0.032 0.775 0.217 0.008 0.059 3072
Public 0.806 0.267 0.505 0.175 0.144 0.812 0.044 0.033 1539
IS Private 0.653 0.503 0.257 0.027 0.770 0.220 0.010 0.076 1554
Public 0.865 0.299 0.473 0.197 0.143 0.808 0.049 0.046 748
ITALY Private 0.611 0.413 0.416 0.067 0.676 0.303 0.021 0.032 15168
Public 0.776 0.259 0.478 0.231 0.149 0.782 0.069 0.029 5129
29Table 4: Log of hourly wage by Area, Gender, Sector and Position.
Area Sector Blue White Man. Blue White Man.
Women Men
NW Private 1.838 2.039 2.391 1.987 2.190 2.647
Public 1.957 2.277 2.560 2.053 2.305 2.675
NE Private 1.836 2.045 2.298 1.969 2.195 2.549
Public 2.002 2.267 2.405 2.116 2.331 2.629
C Private 1.799 2.024 2.211 1.944 2.166 2.622
Public 1.993 2.301 2.365 2.076 2.211 2.561
S Private 1.598 1.821 2.178 1.831 2.058 2.503
Public 1.805 2.265 2.298 1.976 2.222 2.444
IS Private 1.770 1.872 2.148 1.772 2.001 2.591
Public 1.939 2.253 2.381 2.061 2.277 2.616
ITALY Private 1.790 2.011 2.305 1.920 2.154 2.605















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 6: Statistics for relevance and exogeneity of instruments from rst step of IV regression by
Gender. All years. Only coecients attached to exclusion restrictions.
Women Men
Father Home Father & Father Home Father &
Home Home
Father pub. 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.085*** 0.084***
Non-owner 0.002 0.006 0.010 0.010
Children 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.020*** 0.021***
Obs. 11429 14378 11429 16668 20040 16668
R2 0.305 0.290 0.308 0.272 0.271 0.273
Joint sig. 39.2*** 15.9*** 21.0*** 41.9*** 8.6*** 19.4***
J test 7.0*** 10.8*** 20.2*** 16.5***
Redundancy 34.3*** 23.5*** 40.9*** 14.5***
Note: *** is 1% signicance level; ** is 5% signicance level; * is 10% signicance level.
32Table 7: Statistics for relevance and exogeneity of instruments from rst step of IV regression by
Gender. Year 2004. Only coecients attached to exclusion restrictions.
Instrument Father Home Father & Discount Risk Social FHDSa FHDRSa
Home
2004 { Women
Father pub. 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.058 0.003
Mother pub. -0.019 -0.019 -0.061 -0.169
Non-owner 0.002 -0.015 -0.118** -0.005
Children 0.016 0.034** 0.058 0.120*
High disc. 0.018 -0.093 -0.343**
Lower disc. 0.040 -0.104 -0.200*
Risk av. -0.002 0.074
Pro-social 0.137** 0.121 0.178
Obs. 1396 2417 1396 808 291 380 319 134
RMSE 0.422 0.420 0.422 0.426 0.438 0.437 0.448 0.441
R2 0.229 0.252 0.230 0.245 0.232 0.210 0.187 0.226
J test 0.079 0.054 0.932 0.000 . . 4.382 14.402**
Joint sig. 5.287*** 0.784 3.677*** 0.590 0.001 3.906** 1.456 2.000*
Redundancy 0.748 5.859* 6.266 2.943 0.835 2.839*
2004 { Men
Father pub. 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.149*** 0.253***
Mother pub. 0.049 0.049 0.146** 0.178*
Non-owner -0.001 -0.003 -0.014 -0.015
Children 0.014 -0.003 -0.014 0.047
High disc. 0.038 -0.017 0.132*
Lower disc. -0.025 -0.036 -0.047
Risk av. 0.069** 0.099*
Pro-social -0.016 -0.047 -0.114*
Obs. 2355 3366 2355 1856 653 851 712 260
RMSE 0.365 0.366 0.365 0.392 0.396 0.373 0.376 0.378
R2 0.280 0.265 0.280 0.266 0.269 0.341 0.341 0.373
J test 1.272 1.322 2.153 0.725 . . 14.157*** 5.875
Joint sig. 19.682*** 1.187 9.857*** 3.815** 4.408** 0.178 3.296*** 3.950***
Redundancy 20.131*** 0.707 21.555*** 1.081 3.987** 1.372
Note: *** is 1% signicance level; ** is 5% signicance level; * is 10% signicance level.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 9: Robustness checks, using various denitions and/or various model specications to explain
the pay gap. Coecients of \Public", \Small - Private" and \Large - Private" by Gender.
Women Men
Exp. Big Ent. Monthly Monthly Exp. Big Ent. Monthly Monthly
No Hours No Hours
Exogenous
Public 0.136*** 0.072*** 0.018** 0.039*** -0.033*** -0.061***
Small -0.172*** -0.079***
Large -0.041*** 0.033***
Obs. 14378 14327 14256 14363 20040 19947 19865 19972
Endogenous
Public 0.380*** 0.253** 0.181* 0.309*** 0.221** 0.193**
Small -0.203*** -0.100***
Large -0.074** 0.044**
Obs. 11429 11394 11331 11416 16668 16596 16528 16611
Note: *** is 1% signicance level; ** is 5% signicance level; * is 10% signicance level.







































36Figure 2: Distribution function for (log of) hourly wage, by Gender and Sector. Kernel density (a)
and Cumulative distribution functions (b and c).
a)
b) c)
37Figure 3: Coecient of PUBLIC across quantiles. Overall estimates (a), estimates by geographical
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